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to induce payment, is the purpose of the collector's activities. The vital question
is not whether the distress is intentionally or negligently inflicted, since intent
can be found easily in these cases, but rather the degree of care which is re-
quired in such conduct.
In sum, the attempt to measure the reasonableness of the collector's actions
is a process of balancing the interests of the creditor against those of the debtor.68
Examining the vulnerability of the debtor, the validity of the debt, and the
state of mind of the collector is a method of weighing the financial interest
of the creditor in the collection of his debt against the personality interest of
the debtor in freedom from emotional distress.
The imposition of a standard of reasonableness upon the collection process,
because of the particular vulnerability of the debtor to mental distress, provides
a flexible protection for the interests of both the debtor and the creditor. If the
law has required extreme and outrageous conduct as a prerequisite to liability
in order to ensure that the claimed mental distress has in fact occurred, the spe-
cial relationship of the creditor to the debtor and the greater likelihood that any
claims of mental distress will be legitimate make this area a favorable one for
expansion.
Duane L. Nelson*
6 8 Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1963), writ of review refused, 245 La.
84, 157 So. 2d 231 (1963).
* Member, Second Year Class.
PUBLISHER'S TREATMENT OF NEWSWORTHY EVENT
HELD VIOLATION OF PRIVACY STATUTE:
HILL V. HAYES
On September 11, 1952, the plaintiffs and their children were held hostage
in their home by three escaped convicts. In the sprng of 1953, defendant Hayes
wrote a novel entitled The Desperate Hours, which portrayed a family held hostage
in their home by escaped convicts. The novel was inspired by the experience of
the plaintiffs' family but contained significant factual differences. It was later
made into a play and movie bearing the same title. After the play had opened, the
defendant publisher of Life magazine printed an article entitled True Crme In-
sptres Tense Play.' The article used the plaintiffs' name in a form which sensa-
tionally portrayed the play as a true-to-life version of the family's ordeal.2
1 Life, Feb. 28, 1955, p. 75.
2 The article complained of contained pictures of scenes from the play taken on
location at the Hills' former residence, where they were held hostage. The defendant
publisher arranged at its own expense to photograph the scenes at the residence. The text
of the article which identified the plaintiffs by name was: "Three years ago Americans all
NOTES
The plaintiffs sued for violation of their right of privacy under New York
statutory law and recovered a judgment against the magazine publisher.3 The
Appellate Division affirmed, with Presiding Justice Botein dissenting, but directed
a new trial on the issue of damages.4 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion, and two judges joined in a written dissent.5
New York Law
The right of privacy in New York is not a common law right6 but is purely
statutory.7 Since the statute permits recovery only for the unauthorized use of
one's name or pictures for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, the pro-
tection is more narrow than is provided m common law ]unsdictions.9
The New York courts are attempting to resolve the conflict between msunng
the freedom of the press and protecting the individual's right of privacy 10 in light
of the statutory purpose of protecting the sentiments, thoughts and feelings of the
individual by preventing the commercial exploitation of his personality." They
over the country read about the desperate ordeal of the James Hill family, who were held
prisoners in their home outside Philadelphia by three escaped convicts. Later they read
about it m Joseph Hayes's novel, The Desperate Hours, inspired by the family's experi-
ence. Now they can see the story re-enacted in Hayes's Broadway play based on the book,
and next year will see it in his movie, which has been filmed but is being held up until
the play has a chance to pay off." Ibid.
3 Author Hayes and the theatrical producers exonerated themselves by convincing
the jury that the novel and play were pure fiction and were not based upon the Hill
experience. HOFSTADTER & HoRowIz, THE BhRGr OF PRIVACY, 145-47 (1964).
4 Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963). See generally
HOFSTADTER & Honowrrz, supra note 3, at 141-49.
5 Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), prob.
iuns. noted sub. nom. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 86 Sup. Ct. 392 (1965) (No. 562).
6 The origin of the right of privacy is found in the famous law review article, Warren
& Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The New York Court of
Appeals rejected the argument of Warren and Brandeis at an early date, and refused to
recognize a common law right of privacy. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAriF. L. REv. 383-85
(1960); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093-98 (1962).
7 N.Y. Civ. RiHTs LAw §§ 50-51. Section 50 is a penal provision which was not
applied in the Hill case. Section 51 states: "Any person whose name, portrait or picture
is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the
written consent first obtained may sue and recover damages "
8 Any representation is a "picture" within the meaning of the statute. Binns v. Vita-
graph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
9 See PRossER, ToRTs § 112 (3d ed. 1964).
10 Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779
(Sup. Ct.) aff'd per curtam, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947); Lahn v. Daily
Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937). The New York statute
was declared constitutional and not in violation of either the state or federal constitution.
Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908), aff'd, 220 U.S.
502 (1910).
11 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951),
aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); cf. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276,
164 N.E.2d 853, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959); Lahm v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776,
295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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have recognized as an exception to the statute a "newsworthy" privilege permitting
the publication of names and pictures in connection with the dissemination of
news and educational and informational material which is within the public in-
terest.12
This privilege, however, is narrowed by several significant limitations. The pub-
lisher may be liable if the person's name or picture has only a tenuous connection
with, and no legitimate relationship to, the news item or educational article.'3
The privilege is further limited by the requirement that the presentation must not
be sensationalized' 4 or fictionalized. 15 But untrue statements alone may not be
sufficient to remove the privilege. The fictional material must have no educational
value or must reveal mtimate details of a person's life which are repugnant to the
public's sense of decency.' 6 If, for any of these reasons, the publisher has lost the
newsworthy privilege then he will be liable for the commercial exploitation of the
plamtiff's personality for "purposes of trade."
While recognizing the narrow newsworthy privilege for the benefit of pub-
lishers, the courts have been liberal in applying the statute's prohibition against
using one's name or picture for "purposes of advertising."' 7 The statute clearly
forbids the use of a person's name or picture where such use is solely to advertise
or draw attention to some commercial product. This is termed a "collateral" or
direct use of a name or picture for "purposes of advertising."' 8 However, the pro-
12 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 34 F Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc.,
277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath,
Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 272 App. Div. 759,
69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
13 Lahm v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
14 See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951),
aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (pnvilege does not include form distinct
from news dissemination); Sutton v. Hearst Corp., 277 App. Div. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233
(1950) (sensationalized presentation of facts); Kneger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167
Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (name used over one hundred times in story).
15 Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119
(1950) (comic book portrayal of heroic event); Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 207
Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (picture depicting boy as juvenile delin-
quent); Lahm v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(picture of Hindu musician related to feature on Indian rope trick).
16 Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d
701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963); Koussevitzky v.
Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curtain,
272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
17 See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43&Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
is See Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 164 N.E.2d 853, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975
(1959) (name used to advertise office safe business); Sesman v. Umversal Photo Books,
Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 151, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963) (photograph advertising cameras);
Schneiderman v. New York Post Corp., 31 Misc. 2d 697, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (wedding photograph advertising country club in which publisher owned inter-
est); Rubino v. Slaughter, 136 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (photograph advertising
union election handbill); Lane v. F W Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 256 App. Div. 1065, 12 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1939) (photograph used
in lockets).
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hibition does not apply to publishers who use an mdividual's name or picture to
illustrate the quality or content of their own publications.19 The justification for
this obvious inconsistency is that such advertising is indispensable to the exhibition
or sale of the medium.20
In contrast to the "collateral" or direct use, the occurrence of a person's name
or picture in a publication may be so unrelated to the subject matter that the use
is called "incidental" and is not a violation of the statute.21 Such an "incidental"
use is found only where the person's name or picture was not exploited for
"purposes of trade."
The Hill case stands as a borderline application of the right of privacy statute.
The cogency of the dissenting opinions and the diversity of legal principles applied
by the majority and concurring opinions warrant a close scrutiny of the opinions
of the Appellate Division.
Majority Opmnton
The majority recognized that, at the time of the family's ordeal, the plaintiffs
were newsworthy subjects and had no protected right of privacy with respect to
legitimate, accurate news reporting. On the other hand, by referring to the pas-
sage of time and stating that the "occurrence had been relegated to the outer fringe
of the public consciousness," 22 the court seems to have indicated that the news-
worthy privilege was exceeded. If so, this would conflict with the established rule
that once an item has achieved the status of newsworthmess, it retains that status
even when it is no longer of current interest.23 However, the court probably did
not intend to withdraw the newsworthy privilege, for it pointed out that the de-
fendant's article erroneously portrayed the play as an accurate representation of
19 E.g., Dallesandro v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 470, 166 N.Y.S.2d 805
(1957) (photograph illustrating book cover); Oma v. Hillman Periodicals, Inc., 281 App.
Div. 240, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1953) (boxer's photograph illustrating magazine cover);
Humiston v. Umversal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y. Supp. 752 (1919)
(name used to advertise newsreel); Jaccard v. R. H. Macy & Co., 176 Misc. 88, 26
N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 15, 37 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1942) (use
of dress designer's name). But see Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 343,
.223 N.Y.S.2d 737, aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962).
20 See Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra note 19.
2 1 See Moglen v. Varsity Pajamas, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 114, 213 N.Y.S.2d 999
(1961) (news article with name pnnted on pajama material); Stillman v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 18, 153 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1956), af'd, 5 N.Y.2d 994, 157
N.E.2d 728, 184 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1959) (name of gymnasium shown in movie); Wallach
v. Bacharach, 192 Misc. 979, 80 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 274 App. Div.
919, 84 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1948) (news article printed in advertising space); Shubert v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem.,
274 App. Div. 751, 80 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1948) (name used in press book); Damron v.
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N.Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct.), a'd mem.,
226 App. Div. 796, 234 N.Y. Supp. 773 (1928) (name used once in novel not action-
able).
22 18 App. Div. 2d at 489, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
23 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (over twenty-five
years); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 435, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 557
(1961); Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119
(1950) (six months); but cf. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276. 164 N.E.2d 853,
196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959) (semble).
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the Hills' experience. This portrayal was the basis for finding that the article was
fictionalized. Since fictionalization is a limitation upon the newsworthy privilege,
it seems that the majority did not withdraw the privilege but rather found that it
had been abused, thereby giving rise to defendant's liability. It is clear that the
court considered the fictionalization sufficiently outrageous to satisfy the test of
Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.24
In addition to finding that the defendant had abused the newsworthy priv-
ilege, the majority found that the defendant was also within the "advertising"
basis of liability in that the article was written "to advertise and attract further
attention to the play, and to increase present and future magazine circulation as
well." 25 The court employed the distinction between a "collateral" and an "inci-
dental" use of the plaintiffs' name when it said, "the use of plaintiffs' name was
primary and not merely incidental to the article."26
To the extent that the majority found the publisher liable solely within the
"advertising," as apart from the "fictionalization," approach, several questions
arise. As pointed out by the dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals, it is doubt-
ful that the defendant would be liable even if the article bad been intended to
advertise the play, since the subject was newsworthy and would naturally attract
attention.27 Moreover, there was no evidence that the defendant had that com-
mercial interest in the play which is normally required in order to find a violation
of the "collateral" rule.28 For these two reasons it seems improper to find the de-
fendant liable for having used the plaintiffs' name to advertise the play as a "col-
lateral" commodity. A similar ambiguity arises from the court's conclusion that the
article was written to increase circulation and thus was used "for purposes of
trade" as proscribed by the statute. Since most newspapers and magazines are
published for a profit and their articles are intended to increase circulation, the
publisher's profit motive has not been and ought not to be the test of a use for
"purposes of trade" as defined by the statute.2 9
The basic ambiguity of the majority's treatment of the defendant's liability ap-
pears in its merger of elements of the publisher's newsworthy privilege with the
broader prohibition against using an individual's name or picture for purposes of
advertising. The court properly found that the publisher had abused its privilege
by fictionalizing the article. The majority's departure from fictionalization and
reliance on the advertising basis of liability was unclear, but the concurring opinion
offers a distinct treatment of advertising as a basis for publisher liability.
Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion, also adopted3O by the Court of Appeals, is partially
an application of established rules. Stating that the Hill incident was still news-
2441 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
25 18 App. Div. 2d at 489, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
26 Ibid.
27 15 N.Y.2d at 989, 207 N.E.2d at 606, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
28 See cases cited supra, note 18.
29 See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Binns v. Vita-
graph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913); Goelet v. Confidential, Inc.,
5 App. Div. 2d 226, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1958).
30 15 N.Y.2d at 987, 207 N.E.2d at 605, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
December, 1965] NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
worthy information in which the public had a legitimate interest,31 the concurring
justice found that the article was fictionalized and concluded that the publisher
was no longer immune from liability.3 2 It was pointed out that had the defendant
properly presented the article no liability would exist.3 3 This undoubtedly means
that, had the publisher avoided representing the play as a true enactment of the
family's experience, no liability would have been found.
Having an established basis for holding the defendant liable, the concurring
justice set forth broader grounds of liability which stimulated the alarm of the
dissenting judges in both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, when
he stated:
If it can be clearly demonstrated that the newsworthy item is presented, not for
the purpose of disseminating news, but rather for the sole purpose of increasing
circulation the privilege to use one's name should not be granted even though
a true account of the event be given-let alone when the account is sensational
and fictionalized.3 4
This dictum suggests a basis of liability which is a departure from New York's
statutory protection of the right of privacy. In protecting the individual from the
unauthorized use of his name or picture for advertising or purposes of trade, the
New York cases fall within the "appropnation" category set forth by Dean Pros-
ser.3 5 In these cases the newsworthy privilege exempts publishers from statutory
liability if the person's name or picture is used in a true account which is news-
worthy. The concurring opinion, however, states that, even though the publisher
has presented a true account which is newsworthy, he will still be liable if a solely
pecuniary purpose can be clearly demonstrated. While the judge does not discuss
how this sole purpose may be determined, referral to broader principles of the law
of privacy in other jurisdictions suggests an answer. The judge is undoubtedly re-
ferring to the publication of material which is both true and of interest to the
public but which involves the disclosure of personal facts where such publicity
would be offensive to one of ordinary sensibilities. In short, the reference is to
that type of abuse arising in cases which Dean Prosser terms "public disclosure
of private facts."3 6 The concurring justice combines these two categories by sug-
gesting that such a disclosure of private facts would serve to "clearly demonstrate"
that the publisher's sole purpose was to increase circulation rather than to present
newsworthy information.
Whereas the concurring opinion tends to merge the two categories, Dean
Prosser points out that the cases classified as "appropriation" and "disclosure"
protect different interests of the individual. The effect of the "appropriation" de-
cisions is to recognize or create an exclusive right in the individual to a species of
trade name, while "disclosure" cases protect against the invasion of something
secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plamtiff.3r The difference between
31 18 App. Div. 2d at 491, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
32 Ibid.
33 18 App. Div. 2d at 491, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
34 18 App. Div. 2d at 491, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 293. (Emphasis added.)
35 P-ossxa, supra note 9, at 839-44.
36 Id. at 834-37.
37 Id. at 842-43.
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these interests was recognized in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,38 where the federal
courts, applying New York law, refused to protect the plaintiff from the disclosure
of private facts. In discussing the origin of New York's right of privacy statute
and its limitations, the court said: "Any liability inposed upon defendant must
therefore be derived solely from the statute, and not from general considerations
as to the right of the individual to prevent publication of the intimate details of
hIs private life."3 9 This decision makes it clear that disclosure of private facts is
not proscribed by the New York statute.
The difference between the two interests can be illustrated further by com-
paring a case which arose in Califorma. Both interests are recognized in Califor-
ma,40 where the right of privacy is derived from the state constitution rather than
from a statute.41 In Melvin v. Reid,42 the plaintiff recovered for the exhibition of
a movie which accurately revived her former life as a prostitute and her prosecu-
tion in a notorious murder trial which had occurred seven years earlier. The court
found that, even though the portrayal was true and newsworthy, the plaintiff was
entitled to be protected from publicity which disclosed her former condition of
depravity. Relying on the state constitution, the California court recognized and
protected an interest which, under the Sidis rule, is beyond the protection afforded
by the New York privacy statute.
Critique
While the Hill case was correctly decided within the limits of the New York
statutory provision, the dictum of the concurring opinion proposes a basis of liabil-
ity winch reaches beyond the scope of the statute. The dissenting judges properly
argued that the suggestion of the concurring opinion would inject an "unrealistic
ingredient" into the law as it exists under the narrow statute.43 It is clear that the
New York privacy statute is too restricted to protect the individual from a dis-
closure of private facts where such publicity would be offensive to one of ordinary
sensibilities.
The dissenting opiions also pointed out the problem of protecting the freedom
of the press by saying that the concurring opmion's proposed expansion of the
right of privacy "would abridge dangerously the peoples' right to know."4 4 This
problem has continued to be one of the primary obstacles in the growth of the
law of privacy since the time Warren and Brandeis first raised the issue in 1890.45
*Overcoming this inhibition of the growth of the right of privacy is not properly
within the discretion of the New York courts. It must be left to the legislature be-
cause of the narrow terms of the New York statute. The Hill case illustrates the
impropriety and confusion which result from the judicial expansion of the statu-
tory limitation on the right of privacy. It is unfortunate that the New York statute,
3834 F Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940).
39 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1940).40 Werner v. Times Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961)
(applying Prosser's categories).41 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
42 Ibid.
43 15 N.Y.2d at 989, 207 N.E.2d at 606, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
44Ibid.
45 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6.
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winch was enacted at the time when the right of privacy was at its infancy, is so
narrow that it precludes the growth of the law of privacy which is occurring in
other jurisdictions.
Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
Defendant Time, Inc. has recently appealed the holding of the New York
courts to the United States Supreme Court, which has noted probable junsdic-
tion. 46
The appellant contends that Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law, when they are construed to award damages for invasion of privacy by the
publication of a review of a play that resembled a prior incident involving a private
person, the review and accompanying photographs being maccurate in some
particulars, abridge the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments.4 7 Claiming that the New York courts impose liability upon publishers
whose news articles are factually maccurate, 48 the appellant asserts that the rules
pertaining to the newsworthy privilege and fictionalization have not been measured
by standards which satisfy the first amendment.49 Accordingly, the Court is asked
to evaluate the constitutional propriety of the protection which New York extends
to the right of privacy,50 in light of the fact that the Court has tested the law of
defamation by the first amendment standard in New York Times v. Sullivan.51 The
brief suggests that a proper test for publisher's liability consistent with the first
amendment would require showing actual malice on the part of the publisher
toward the person whose name or picture is used or a showing of the publisher's
flagrant and reckless disregard for the truth. 2
That portion of the appellant's argument which contends that publishers will
be liable whenever they publish inaccurate news material is clearly wrong. Where
fictionalization does occur, liability arises only when the fictional material has no
educational value or reveals intimate details of a person's life which are repugnant
to the public's sense of decency. 83
The primary issue raised by the appellant is whether all the rules54 which the
New York courts apply in limiting the newsworthy privilege, taken together, fail
to meet the standards of the first amendment. The appellee argues that the New
York legislature formulated the right of privacy law with careful attention to the
freedom of the press guaranteed by the New York state constitution. 5 Shortly after
it was enacted, the statute was tested on constitutional grounds and was upheld.56
The appellant's challenge however, is not directed at the New York statute but
rather at the judicial development of the rules which have culminated in its liabil-
ity The appellee contends that the New York courts have consistently drawn the
46 Time, Inc., v.,Hill, 86 Sup. Ct. 392 (1965).47 Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-3, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra note 46.
48 Id. at 7.
49 Id. at 8, 10.
50 Id. at 11.
51376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Brief for Appellant, p. 23.
58 See note 16 supra and accompanying text; Brief for Appellee, pp. 4, 16-17.
54 See notes 10-21 supra and accompanying text.
55 Brief for Appellee, p. 3.
56 Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908), aff'd,
220 U.S.. 502 (1910).
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